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Abstract 
This paper estimates the willingness to pay of Flemish households for continuous power supply, based on a 
stated preference approach. The data were collected via choice experiments which were then used to estimate 
a set of logit models ranging from a main effects conditional logit model to random parameter logit model with 
interaction effects and correlated preferences. Power outages are characterized by 6 attributes: annual 
frequency, duration, peak or off peak, announced or unannounced, winter or summer and invoice impact. All 
estimates have the expected sign and are used to assess the marginal willingness to pay by Flemish households 
for each of these attributes. Overall, the estimates suggest that Flemish households have heterogeneous 
preferences regarding power outage attributes, and that a significant share of them is willing to switch to a 
lower reliability level if that would be compensated by a relatively small electricity bill discount. 
We further illustrate i) how the model estimates can be used to assess the impact on a household’s consumer 
surplus of a transition from an initial power outage state of the world (the status quo in the choice experiment) 
to a new state of the world, and ii) how the estimates can be used to assess the market potential of different 
power outage profiles if they would be offered for sale by electricity suppliers and/or distribution companies. 
Again, these illustrations show that some market potential exists for differentiated power outage contracts. 
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1  The paper strongly benefited from the research project ‘Embedded generation: a global approach to energy balance and grid power 
quality and security’, financed by the Agency for Innovation by Science and Technology (IWT). 
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The Value of Continuous Power Supply for Flemish 
Households 
This paper assesses the role of attitudes, perceptions, consumer experience and socio-demographic 
characteristics on the willingness to pay for continuous power supply in Flanders (Belgium). In many 
European countries, the reliability of power supply was and still is very high, mainly because of the 
high engineering standards applied in the pre-liberalization era. As a result, customers and policy 
makers did not – and in many cases still do not – really care about supply interruptions as their 
occurrence is perceived be very unlikely. However, the recent past has shown a number of large 
power outages or black-outs in Europe, for example in Hungary (1999), Finland (2001), Italy (2003) 
and Sweden (2005). 
Belgium has had relatively little experience with large scale power outages, an observation that is 
supported by the power outage statistics presented in Figure 1 and Figure 2. Together with The 
Netherlands, it is among the best performing European countries when it comes to the reliability of 
power supply. Figure 3 and Table 1 present more detailed data for the Flemish region, the northern 
part of Belgium. The average number of minutes with a power interruption per year and per 
customer served (SAIDI) is about 23 minutes (Table 1), which is well below the number of minutes 
reported by most other European countries2. This table also illustrates the variability of the SAIDI 
within Flanders, i.e. between the Flemish distribution areas. Figure 3 illustrates the same variability. 
Power supply interruptions are usually due to exceptional events, but some argue that in the near 
European future the number of interruptions might also increase for reasons related to the 
economic context. This view is based on the argument that the recent liberalization of the energy 
markets induces generators and system operators to become more cost efficient, which might result 
in reduced maintenance and investment outlays. Increased competitive and regulatory pressure 
creates incentives for cost-savings which might result in a deterioration of reliability levels (Ajodhia 
and Hakvoort (2005)). 
Whether this is good or bad remains to be seen. The Council of European Energy Regulators (2009) 
correctly states that ‘The design and operation of the power system should be such that the number 
and duration of interruptions is acceptable to most customers, without incurring unacceptably high 
costs’. Finding a balance between reliability and costs remains one of the major challenges for the 
electricity sector, but it should, for example, also be recognized that the optimal reliability level can 
be different for different customers and for different regions. Put differently, it might be possible 
that some customer groups are willing to accept a lower reliability level if that would imply a 
reduction in their cost of electricity. From a social point of view, this would be beneficial, as it would 
                                                          
2 The Flemish data concern incidents reported at the mid voltage level. Data on power outages at the low voltage level are currently not 
available. This can have a significant impact on the reported indices. Although the impact of an interruption in terms of number of 
customers affected is much smaller at the low voltage level, the duration of an interruption is usually much longer. To illustrate the 
potential impact: the Council of European Energy Regulators (2009) reports that in Italy about 7% of SAIFI and 22% of SAIDI (measured 
between 1999 and 2007) is due to incidents at the low voltage level. In Hungary, 19% of SAIFI and 30% of SAIDI were due to incidents 
at the LV level ((measured between 2003 and 2006).  
Most countries differentiate their reliability indices per voltage level. However, the definition of the different voltage levels also tends 
to differ between countries. This makes it very difficult to compare reliability indices between countries. 
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result in cost savings in terms of investments in power and grid infrastructure. Furthermore, 
expenditures on improved power quality could be targeted to those customers that actually require 
continuous supply and that are willing to pay a premium for this service. For example, having a 
continuous power supply is important for industries like the chemical, petroleum, refining, paper, 
metal or telecommunications industry. But despite the good Flemish records regarding reliable 
electricity supply, we do indeed observe that many firms operating in these sectors invest in 
additional backup generation or uninterruptible power supply devices. Targeting investments and 
efforts to these companies might be more efficient than improving the overall efficiency and 
reliability of the power grid. 
Also, reliability requirements for the grid can evolve over time as electric equipment changes and 
new technologies emerge that allow for on-site solutions for reliability risks. In general, the energy 
market liberalization makes market players more aware of the value of having and the cost of 
providing reliable electricity. The efficiency of the market would benefit if that value would be taken 
into account when designing the future power system. 
This paper focuses on the Flemish residential sector and assesses its willingness to pay for 
continuous power supply under varying conditions. Investments in backup equipment and in UPS 
devices are less frequently found in the residential sector, which in itself can be seen as an indication 
that the residential sector puts less value on continuous power supply than some industries do. 
However, about 25% of electricity is consumed by the residential sector which makes it sufficiently 
important to investigate in terms of willingness to pay for continuous supply. 
It is our conjecture that the efficiency of the electricity system can be improved by a more 
personalized approach in terms of reliability levels offered to customers. We feel that a vast number 
of residential customers are willing to accept lower reliability levels if adequate compensation is 
offered3. The main objective of this paper is to estimate the level of compensation that would be 
required to counterbalance for these reduced reliability levels, conditional upon different 
characteristics of a power outage (such as the timing and announcement characteristics, duration 
and the frequency of the power outages). At the same time, these estimates also indicate the 
willingness to pay (WTP) by Flemish households for increased reliability levels. 
Finding the appropriate compensation level requires knowledge about preferences on continuous 
power supply. This kind of information can be derived from revealed behavior or from stated 
behavior4. See Munasinghe and Sanghvi (1988) and Serra and Fierro (1997) for a survey of papers on 
this topic in the area of continuous power supply. In the past, the revealed preference approach was 
used more frequently, but more recently the focus has shifted to using stated preferences data, i.e. 
data collected via surveys in which respondents are asked to assess hypothetical situations. This is 
also the approach followed in this paper. We construct a choice experiment (CE) in which we 
confront respondents with a number of hypothetical power outage profiles, containing different 
combinations of outage attributes or characteristics (frequency, duration, timing…). The respondent 
is then asked to indicate the profile that he or she prefers. The approach comes close to a real 
                                                          
3 This would be similar what is already available in many industries via interruptible electricity contracts. Moreover, the introduction of 
smart grids would make such contracts relatively easy to implement. 
4 For a further and more elaborate discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the various revealed and stated preferences 
approaches we refer to Hsu et al. (1994). That paper also explains why the estimated outage costs may differ according to the 
approach or method that is used. 
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market situation as respondents effectively have to make a choice and one of the major advantages 
is that, by describing a power outage profile in terms of attributes and attribute levels, the relative 
importance (value) of the different attributes can be assessed. 
To assess the WTP for continuous power supply (or the willingness-to-accept (WTA) power outages) 
we estimate a discrete choice model. Conjoint choice data are typically analyzed with a logit model, 
see for example Beenstock et al. (1998). As Train (2003) and Moore (2008) point out, one drawback 
of the standard logit model is that homogenous preferences are assumed. Logit models tackle 
heterogeneity only to the extent that it is explained, for example, by interacting demographic or 
household characteristics with the attributes of the product under consideration. Therefore, in this 
paper, we estimate a heterogeneous preference model, more specifically a Random Parameters or 
mixed logit model (RPL) (Train (2003)). Over the past years, the number of applications of RPL 
models has increased, e.g. Carlsson and Martinsson (2008) for preferences for continuous power 
supply in Sweden. As explained by Moore (2008) one drawback of the standard RPL model is that, 
although heterogeneous preferences are allowed for, the sources of heterogeneity often remain 
unexplored. This could easily be handled by estimating the distribution of the random preference 
parameters conditional upon individual characteristics. See Morey and Rossmann (2003) and Moore 
(2008) for illustrations of this approach. In this paper, we follow a similar approach by conditioning 
the distribution of the preference parameters on individual characteristics but also on information 
regarding attitudes, perception and past experience. 
Although the choice experiment approach does not provide direct estimates of the WTP, it can be 
estimated indirectly via the parameters of the estimated model. Furthermore, estimating an RPL 
model also allows obtaining individual specific WTP estimates, which then allows analyzing the 
distribution of the WTP values in the population. See, for example, Carlsson and Martinsson (2006) 
and Carlsson and Martinsson (2008). 
Alternatively, heterogeneous preferences could also be introduced via a latent class model along the 
lines of Morey et al. (2006) or Boxall and Adamowicz (2002). Morey et al. (2006) considers both 
attitudes and choices as expressions of (exogenous) underlying preferences. Therefore, group or 
class membership is exogenous. On the contrary, Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) assume that 
attitudes determine group membership. In their view, group or class membership is endogenous. 
Moore (2008) compares the three modeling approaches and concludes that assuming 
heterogeneous preferences adds to the explanatory power of the models. Furthermore, despite 
differences in the underlying assumptions and in the parameter estimates, the WTP-estimates 
derived from the three models show little difference. Therefore, from a policy perspective the main 
message is that it does not matter how attitudinal data are included in empirical models, as long as 
they are included. 
The major contributions of our paper are i) estimating household preferences for continuous power 
supply by applying a stated preferences approach to the Flemish electricity market, while ii) 
assessing the role of the respondent’s personal characteristics, including attitudes, perceptions and 
past experience by iii) assuming heterogeneous preferences regarding continuous power supply. 
While a number of papers have already studied the role of attitudes and perception in further 
reducing unexplained preference heterogeneity, this paper is – to our knowledge – the first one to 
consider this issue in the context of continuous (residential) power supply. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 briefly presents the RPL model and its underlying 
assumptions. Section 2 describes the data collection process and the data that are available. Section 
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3 presents estimates of the preference parameters for four models, ranging from a simple 
conditional main effects logit model to a RPL model with interaction effects and correlated 
preferences. Section 4 then presents WTP/WTA estimates for changes in power outage attribute 
levels and their distribution in the Flemish population. Moreover, this section also assesses the 
welfare effect at the individual level of creating a market for power outage profiles. That is, a market 
where households can buy a suitable power outage profile from their electricity supplier. Finally, 
section 5 concludes. 
System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI – minutes per customer served) 
(Sum of all customer interruption durations/total number of customers served) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Min  6,85  8,63 -  0,00  9,08  9,60 
Weighted average  21,78  22,22 -  28,22  22,19  18,88 
Max  86,92  88,53 -  71,00  98,65  84,15 
Wtd St. Dev.  6,87  8,64 -  11,11  8,21  8,04 
System Average Interruption Frequency Index (SAIFI – interruptions per customer served) 
(total number of customer interruptions/total number of customers served)  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Min  0,280  0,271 -  0,000  0,225  0,354 
Weighted average  0,555  0,527 -  0,679  0,556  0,579 
Max  1,655  1,646 -  1,459  1,870  1,658 
Wtd St. Dev.  0,195  0,166 -  0,194  0,160  0,157 
Customer Average Interruption Duration Index (CAIDI –minutes per customer affected) 
(Sum of all customer interruption durations/total number of customers interrupted)  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average 
Min  18,00  21,47 -  0,00  26,62  23,50 
Weighted average  40,93  41,78 -  40,62  39,57  32,58 
Max  66,00  60,12 -  84,00  63,05  61,00 
Wtd St. Dev.  10,03  11,57 -  10,21  7,22  8,74 
The data refer to the mid-voltage level. Interruptions at the transmission level and at the low voltage level 
are not included VREG (2008). 
Table 1: Aggregate power outage data for Flanders. 
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Figure 1: SAIDI for some European countries (at HV, MV and LV)5. 
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Figure 2: SAIFI for some European countries (at HV, MV and LV). 
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Figure 3: SAIFI for the Flemish distribution companies (at MV). 
                                                          
5 Data from Council of European Energy Regulators (2009). 
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1. The Model 
We use a Random Utility Model (RUM) to analyze household preferences. The RUM is based on 
random utility theory which starts from the assumption that decision units maximize utility, i.e. 
when a decision maker is faced with a set of different alternatives, he or she will always choose the 
one with the highest utility. Let the decision unit n  face T  consecutive choice problems each of 
which implies a choice to be made between J  alternatives. From each of the alternatives j  a utility 
level njtU  can be obtained, which is known to the decision unit but is only partially observed by the 
researcher, i.e. 
 njt njt njtU V   , (1) 
with njtV  observed utility and njt  unobserved utility, represented as a random term. For each choice 
problem C , a decision unit will select the alternative that provides maximal utility. Thus, at time t  
alternative j  is chosen by decision unit n  when 
 njt nitU U i j C     (2) 
Due to the presence of the random component in equation (1) only probabilistic statements can be 
made about the respondent’s choices. The probability of choosing alternative j  from choice set C  
can be written as 
 
   
 
 
,   
,   
,   
njt nit
njt njt nit nit
nit njt njt nit
P j C P U U i j C
P V V i j C
P V V i j C
 
 
    
      
      
 (3) 
Assume that njt  is i.i.d. type I extreme value. It can then be shown that, for decision unit n , the 
probability of choosing j , when faced with choice set C  at time t , equals 
 
njt
nit
V
njt V
i C
e
P
e



. (4) 
Usually, observed utility is assumed to be linear in the parameters, i.e. 
 njt njtV x , (5) 
with njtx  a vector of alternative-specific attributes and   the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
Equations (4) and (5) define the conditional logit model. Note that the parameter vector is not 
indexed, implying that preferences are assumed to be homogeneous. This is a rather extreme 
assumption that can be relaxed by allowing tastes to vary over the population with density  f   
(Train (2003)). We can then rewrite equation (5) as 
 njt n njtV x , (6) 
where the heterogeneity of preferences is now made explicit by indexing  . Note that n  is 
assumed constant over time, i.e. preferences of decision unit n  are stable over consecutive choice 
situations, which for the current application is a realistic assumption. However, as will become clear 
in section 3.1, we will allow n  to vary with personal characteristics of the decision unit 
(demographic variables, attitudes, experience….). 
 8 
In this paper, we assume preferences to follow a normal density, i.e. n n     with 
 ,n N      or  0,n N    where n  is a vector of individual-specific deviations that are 
assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and covariance matrix  . A decision unit knows 
his own n  when choosing an alternative, but the researcher does not. Conditional on n , the 
probability of decision unit n  choosing alternative j  at time t  is 
  
n njt
n nit
x
njt n x
i C
e
L
e






. (7) 
Knowing that njt  is i.i.d. extreme value over decision units, alternatives and time, we can write the 
conditional probability that a decision maker will make a given sequence of choice  1 2, ,..., Tj j jj  
as 
 
 
1
n nj tt
n ni tt
xT
n n x
t
i C
e
e







jL
. 
As the researcher does not know n , he or she has to consider all possible values of   to arrive at 
the unconditional choice probability of decision unit n  choosing the sequence of alternatives j : 
 
   | ,n nP f d     j jL  
  
1
| ,
nj tt
ni tt
xT
n x
t
i C
e
P f d
e

 
  


 

j . (8) 
Equation (8) cannot be solved analytically, but simulation techniques can be used to solve for the 
preference parameters that maximize the simulated log-likelihood function6 (Train (2003)). 
2. The Data 
The analysis in this paper focuses on the Flemish residential sector and is based on survey data 
collected from 1488 households in the period November 2004 to January 2005. The Flemish region is 
the Dutch speaking northern part of Belgium. Early 2005, Flanders counted just over 6 million 
inhabitants and about 2,5 million households. 
The first part of the survey collects information about the respondent’s experience with power 
outages. These questions also prepare the respondent for the choice experiment question in the 
second part of the questionnaire by forcing them to think about the issue of continuous power 
supply, about past experiences and the possible consequences of power outages. In the second part 
we collect information on the respondent’s attitude towards power outages and electricity markets 
in general. This part also contains 12 choice experiment questions. Finally, the third part collects 
information on relevant socio-demographic characteristics (such as household size, education, 
energy dependence, income level…). On average, it took about 36 minutes to fill in the 
questionnaire. 
                                                          
6 Actual estimations were done with STATA’s mixlogit procedure. 
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Table 2 and Table 3 summarize information on experience, attitude and market data as obtained 
from the survey. The upper part of Table 2 reports on experience with power outages. The reported 
average annual number of power outages is 0,91, which is about twice as high as the annual number 
of power outages reported by the VREG (see Table 1, SAIFI). Clearly, both numbers cannot easily be 
compared as the frequency reported by the VREG concerns power outages emerging at the mid 
voltage level, while the reported number in the table below includes all power outages, irrespective 
of the voltage level at which the outage is induced7. Just over 20% of households explicitly report 
zero power outages over the past two years (not in the table). More than 75% of the respondents 
report 2 or less power outages in two years time, less than 5% of households were hit by at least 5 
outages over the past two year before the survey date. 
On average, respondents were disconnected from power supply for just over 100 minutes per year, 
which is about 2,5 times as much as reported by the VREG (see Table 1, CAIDI). About 5% of 
households reported a total duration of power outages of more than 5 hours per year (not in the 
table). For 25% of the households, the average annual duration of power outages was less than 23 
minutes. Again, note that these responses also include outages that are induced at the lower voltage 
level, which might to large extent explain the difference with the reported VREG data. 
According to the respondents, most of the reported power outages were unannounced. The median 
response was zero announced power outages, i.e. more than 50% of the respondents claim that they 
did not receive any advance notice for any of the power outages they incurred. 
Experiencea 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Average 1st Q. Median 3th Q. SD N 
Number of PO experienced over the past 2 years? 1,82 1 1 2 1,93 1195 
Number of minutes hit by PO over the past 2 years? 209,16 45 120 240 398,26 923 
If remembered, how many PO were announced? 0,75 0 0 1 2,15 718 
Attitudea 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Average 1st Q. Median 3th Q. SD N 
Starting from how many PO per year would you say 
that your electricity company is performing below 
acceptable standards? 
2,66 1 2 4 3,30 1.410 
Market dataa 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Average 1st Q. Median 3th Q. SD N 
Electricity consumption over the past year (kWh) 4.618 2.233 3.450 5.373 4.046 1.065 
Electricity bill (€) 636 352 533 789 443 1.065 
a
: Based on sample data. Reported frequencies differs from 1488 due to missing values. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for continuous experience, attitude and market data. 
The survey also contained a question about the acceptable annual number of power outages for the 
household. More than half of the Flemish households consider at most 2 power outages per year as 
acceptable and more than 25% considers more than 3 power outages per year as acceptable. On 
average, 2,7 power outages per year are considered acceptable, which is largely above the reported 
frequency of power outages, which was less than one per year. This suggests that a significant 
fraction of the residential sector might easily be convinced to accept a reduction in the reliability 
level of power supply. 
                                                          
7 In the survey, power outages are defined as ‘any interruption of power supply (i.e. voltage drop to zero) with a duration from a few 
seconds to even days that impacts your dwelling, but also your neighbor’s dwelling. It is explicitly stated that a blown fuse in the 
respondent’s house is not considered as a power outage as defined for the survey. 
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In the survey, average electricity consumption was 4.618 kWh per year per household, for which on 
average €636 was paid. 
In Table 3 we report some statistics on categorical data related to experience, attitudes and the 
market. The vast majority of households (73,4%) reported that no material damages were 
experienced due to the power outages that hit them. 
About 65% of households considers the annual number of power outages that strikes them (0,93 on 
average) as low to very low. This also supports the previously suggested hypothesis that a relaxation 
of reliability levels might be acceptable for a large group of households. When asked about what one 
expects to happen with the future reliability level of power supply, about 71% of households do not 
expect any change. From those that do expect a change in the reliability level, the majority (14,5%) 
thinks that reliability levels will increase. When asked whether one would be willing to pay for an 
increased reliability level, 75% of households answers negative, almost 9% answers positive, and 
16,2% does not know. Almost 21% of households would accept reduced reliability levels if this would 
imply a financial compensation, while 66% would not accept reduced reliability levels. Again, we 
observe that households are more inclined to accept a reduction of the reliability level rather than 
an increase. This should not be very surprising, as it is well known from the literature that WTA is 
usually substantially higher than WTP. See for example Horowitz and McConnell (2002). 
When asked about an appropriate period of advance notice, about 34% of households respond that 
1 working day would be appropriate, while 40,4% considers 3 working days as appropriate. 
Households were also asked to reflect upon the per kWh price level for electricity consumed during 
the day (in 2004, this was about €0,15 including VAT). More than 60% of households consider this a 
high to very high price per kWh, while about one third of households consider it to be a fair price.  
Table 3 also provides some insight in the demographic, geographical and market characteristics of 
the sample. About 85% of households own the house they live in. About 43% of households report 
to live in an urban area, while almost 69% is living in a city center. 
When asking about their electricity supplier, 19% of households report to have switched away from 
one of the two default suppliers8. At the time of the survey, almost 60% did not switch but decided 
to sign a contract with their default supplier. Only 6% of households state that looking for another 
supplier is not worth the effort, despite the fact that about 45% of households perceive their 
electricity bill as high to very high. 
Finally, information about the (major) heating system is also reported as this might help to explain 
why respondent are (not) willing to accept reduced reliability levels in power supply. About 13% of 
households report to heat their house with an electric heating device. 
Overall, the data seem to provide some support for the idea that a reduced reliability level might be 
acceptable for a non-negligible fraction of households in return for a financial compensation. 
                                                          
8 Two default suppliers are operating in the Flemish market, Electrabel Customers Solutions and Luminus. These were the suppliers in the 
market before the move to liberalized markets. After opening the residential market for competition, all residential customers were by 
default assigned to their old supplier (the default supplier). Customers could then either do nothing, switch to another supplier or 
explicitly decide to stay with their default supplier, by signing a contract with that supplier. 
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Experience 
       
Damage incurred by a PO (past 2 
years)? (N = 884) 
Yes No Don't 
know 
Missing    
32 649 27 176    
3,0% 73,4% 3,1% 19,9%    
Attitude, Perception 
       
Do you find the annual number of POs 
in your house…? (N = 884) 
Very low Low Average High Very high No opinion Missing 
338 242 78 35 5 8 178 
38,2% 27,4% 8,8% 4,0% 0,6% 0,9% 20,1% 
In the coming years, will the likelihood 
of a PO…? (N = 1065) 
Decrease No change Increase Missing    
90 755 154 66    
8,5% 70,9% 14,5% 6,2%    
Would you be willing to pay more if 
your electricity company decreased 
the likelihood of being hit by a PO? 
(N = 1065) 
Yes No Don't 
know 
Missing    
92 799 173 1    
8,6% 75,0% 16,2% 0,1%    
Would you accept an increased 
likelihood of being hit by a PO if your 
electricity company would decrease 
your electricity bill? (N = 1065) 
Yes No Don't 
know 
Missing    
219 706 140 -    
20,6% 66,3% 13,1%     
How long in advance outage would 
you want to be informed? (N = 1065) 
4 hours 1 work. 
Day 
3 work. 
days 
5 work. 
days 
Don't care Missing  
25 362 430 210 27 11  
2,3% 34,0% 40,4% 19,7% 2,5% 1,0%  
Would you say the per kWh-price for 
electricity used during the day is…? 
(N = 1065) 
Very low Low Average High Very high No opinion Missing 
 6 348 522 123 49 17 
0,0% 0,6% 32,7% 49,0% 11,5% 4,6% 1,6% 
Market data 
       
House owner? (N = 1065) Yes No Missing     
908 154 3     
85,3% 14,5% 0,3%     
Living in urban area? (N = 1065) Yes No Missing     
455 605 5     
42,7% 56,8% 0,5%     
Living in a city center? (N = 1065) Yes No Missing     
729 335 1     
68,5% 31,5% 0,1%     
Switched away from standard supplier 
or signed contract? (N = 1065) 
Yes No, signed 
contract 
Will 
consider 
soon 
Not worth 
the effort 
Missing   
201 632 152 65 15   
18,9% 59,3% 14,3% 6,1% 1,4%   
Would you say you that your 
electricity bill is…?(N = 1065) 
Very low Low Average High Very high No opinion Missing 
7 42 511 390 86 18 11 
0,7% 3,9% 48,0% 36,6% 8,1% 1,7% 1,0% 
Is your house heated with electric 
heating? (N = 1065) 
Yes No Missing     
142 886 37     
13,3% 83,2% 3,5%     
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for categorical experience, attitude and market data. 
The choice experiment 
At the basis of the choice experiment approach is the idea that any good or service can be described 
by its characteristics or attributes and by the levels that these attributes take9. We selected 6 
attributes to describe a power outage, based on what is commonly found in the literature and on a 
pilot survey. Table 4 lists the attributes and levels used in the survey. 
                                                          
9 We refer to Bateman et al. (2002) and Amaya-Amaya et al. (2008) for a more elaborate discussion of the CE technique. 
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Attribute Description Levels 
Frequency Number of outages per year 1, 2, 4 
Duration Average duration of one outage in minutes 15, 60, 240 
Season Period of the year Winter1, Summer1 
Timing Period of the day Peak2, Off peak2 
Announced Was there advance notice Yes, No 
Bill impact Percentage change in the annual bill -10%, 0, +10% 
1
 Summer: from April to September.  Winter: from October to March. 
2 Peak: on weekdays between 7am and 9am and between 5pm and 10pm. Off peak: on 
weekdays between 9am and 5pm and between 10pm and 7am. The weekend 
Table 4: Attributes and levels. 
A full factorial design comprises 3 33 2 216   different scenarios. Obviously, it would have been too 
complicated for respondents to evaluate all possible power outage scenarios. Therefore, only a 
subset of scenarios was presented to and evaluated by the respondents. Obviously, this affects the 
amount of information that can be collected. Whereas a full factorial design would allow unbiased 
estimation of all possible main and interaction effects in a linear model, a fractional factorial design 
will only allow estimating some of these effects, probably in a biased way. Which effects can be 
estimated and which ones will be biased depends on the constructed fractional factorial design 
(Louvière et al. (2003)). We constructed a design that allowed estimating all main and first-order 
interaction effects, while giving maximal consideration to balancing and orthogonality10. All choice 
sets contained 3 power outage scenarios and the status quo alternative. Each respondent had to 
evaluate 12 choice sets. In total, 24 blocks or versions of the questionnaire were created, each 
containing 12 choice sets. Each block was filled in by approximately 60 respondents. 
3. Model specification and estimation 
Provencher and Bishop (2004) show that more complex models do not necessarily result in better 
out-of-sample forecasts compared to simpler logit models. We therefore present estimation results 
for a range of models, starting with a main effects conditional logit model and increasing complexity 
up to a mixed logit model including interaction effects and covariates related to household attitudes, 
perceptions and experience regarding power outages. See Table 5 for a brief description of the 
models. All model estimates are based on the same set of 32.408 observations, collected from 603 
households11. As noted before, one advantage of the stated preference approach is that it allows 
collecting multiple observations per respondent. As explained in section 2, respondents were asked 
to evaluate 12 choice sets, each containing 3 alternatives and the status quo12. The estimation 
results are grouped in Table 8. 
The random parameters in the mixed logit model were selected by applying the procedure proposed 
by McFadden and Train (2000) and carefully explained by Hensher and Greene (2003). The 
procedure works by constructing artificial variables  
2
in in nz x x   with n jn jnjx x P , with jnP  the 
conditional logit choice probabilities, ,i j  the alternatives and n  a household index. The conditional 
logit model is then re-estimated, including the artificial variables as explanatory variables. The null 
                                                          
10 The efficiency of the fractional factorial design was evaluated with SAS v8.2. This software was also used to select the number of choice 
sets and the number of alternatives per choice set and to create the choice sets. A thorough discussion and many detailed examples 
are found in Kuhfeld (2004). 
11 Note that this is substantially less than the original sample size of 1488 households. The difference is due to the presence of missing 
values in at least one of the variables used for the estimation of the correlated RPL model (see section 3.1). 
12 Some households were asked by the survey company to evaluate a second block of 12 choice sets in order to obtained the contracted 
net sample of 1488 households, equally divided over the 24 versions of the questionnaire. 
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hypothesis of no random effect is rejected when the estimated coefficient for the artificial variables 
is significantly different from zero. On the basis of this procedure we conclude that all attributes – 
i.e. the frequency and duration of a power outage, season, peak versus off-peak and announcement 
– should have a random parameter. The procedure also suggests that the bill-attribute should have a 
random parameter. However, we decided to estimate a fixed bill parameter in order not to 
complicate the estimation of the willingness to pay values (Hensher and Greene (2003)). 
 
Model Description 
CL_Main Conditional logit model including alternative specific constants and main effects for all power 
outage attributes. 
CL Main & IA Conditional logit model including alternative specific constants, main and interaction effects for all 
power outage attributes and attribute interactions with attitude, perception, experience and 
demographic covariates. 
RPL Main & IA Random parameter logit model including alternative specific constants, main and interaction 
effects for all power outage attributes and attribute interactions with attitude, perception, 
experience and demographic covariates. 
Correlated RPL Main & IA Random parameter logit model with correlated random effects including alternative specific 
constants, main and interaction effects for all power outage attributes and attribute interactions 
with attitude, perception, experience and demographic covariates. 
Table 5: Description of the estimated models. 
All random parameters are assumed to be normally distributed. For the qualitative attributes 
(season, timing and announcement) the choice is based on the empirical distributions of the 
individual parameters, estimated by applying the procedure described by Hensher and Greene 
(2003). The same procedure suggests that for the attributes ‘frequency’ and ‘duration’, a lognormal 
distribution might be more appropriate. However, convergence issues and reported experience 
related to estimating WTP values led us to assume normal densities for these random parameters. 
The latter motivation relates to the fact that WTP estimates based on random parameters following 
a lognormal distribution might take unreasonable values due to the very long right-hand tail 
(Hensher and Greene (2003)). 
3.1. Model specification 
Observed utility is specified as a linear function of power outage attributes (number (N) and length 
(L) of power outages, Peak/off-peak (P), Season (S), announcement (A) and Bill (B)), attribute 
interactions and interactions of attitude, perception, experience, socio-demographic and income 
variables with these attributes. In its most general form, utility nitU  for individual n  of alternative i  
in choice set t , is written as (the subscript n  is omitted to simplify notation): 
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 (9) 
with , , ,  and q m k r sA P E D M  the effects coded covariate terms and K  ( , , , ,K N L A S P ) the individual 
specific preference deviations. The effects coded covariate terms are defined as 
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and further described in Table 6. 
 
Variable Description Coding 
Attitudes 
1
WTPA  WTP more if prob. of a power outage would be reduced? 1=Yes, -1=Don’t know, 0=No 
2
WTPA  WTP more if prob. of a power outage would be reduced? 1=No, -1=Don’t know, 0=Yes 
1
WTAA  WTA more power outages if electricity bill would decrease? 1=Yes, -1=Don’t know, 0=No 
2
WTAA  WTA more power outages if electricity bill would decrease? 1=No, -1=Don’t know, 0=Yes 
Perception 
Pr
1
POP  In your opinion, would you expect future probability of PO to… 1= Decrease, -1= No change, 0=Increase 
Pr
3
POP  In your opinion, would you expect future probability of PO to… 1= Increase, -1= No change, 0=Decrease 
1
ExpenP
 Perceived level of the current electricity bill 1=Very low to avg., -1=No opinion, 0=High to very high 
2
ExpenP
 Perceived level of the current electricity bill 1=High to very high, -1=No opinion, 0=Very low to avg. 
Experience 
POE
 
Did you experience power outages over the past 2 years? 1=Yes, -1= No 
Socio - demographics 
60D   Respondent is older than 60 1= 60
+, -1=younger than 60 
ElHeatD  Household mainly uses electric heating 1=Electr. heating, -1=No electr. heating 
UrbanD  Household lives in urban area 1=Urban, -1=Rural 
HomeD  Respondent spends at lot of time at home 1= Usually at home, -1=Usually not at home 
Income 
LoM  Household reports low income 1 = Inc. in 1
st Q., -1= Unknown,  0=Inc. not in 1st Q. 
MiM  Household reports medium income 1 = Inc. in 2
nd or 3rd Q., -1= Unknown, 0=Inc. not in 2nd or 3rd Q. 
HiM  Household reports high income 1 = Inc. in 4th Q., -1= Unknown, 0 = Inc. not in 4th Q. 
Table 6: Variable definitions and coding of the variables. 
Alternative-specific constants (ASC) are added for the non-status quo alternatives. These constants 
capture variations in choices that cannot be explained by the attributes or by the socio-demographic 
covariates included in the model. As alternatives are unlabeled, we expect the parameters of these 
constants to be equal within each model specification. However, as discussed by Champ et al. 
(2003), Chapter 6, these alternative-specific constants might capture a status quo bias, thus they 
might be significantly different from zero. Negative values would indicate that the respondents 
would prefer not to move away from the status quo. See Hartman et al. (1991) and Beenstock et al. 
(1998) for an assessment of the status quo effect and its implications in the context of reliable 
electricity supply. 
Note that all estimated models are nested in this general specification. The simple conditional logit 
model corresponds to having all interaction parameters equal to zero. The other models are 
extensions of this simple conditional logit specification towards the ultimate model specification 
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described by equation (9). The RPL estimation procedure involved using Maximum Simulated 
Likelihood with 500 Halton draws13. 
3.2. Discussion of the estimation results 
Alternative specific constants 
As expected, all models in Table 8 show significantly negative alternative-specific effects indicating 
the presence of a status quo effect, i.e. respondents tend to prefer the status quo situation rather 
than any of the presented alternatives. Table 7 summarizes the results of a set of Wald-tests used to 
test the hypothesis that the parameters of the alternative-specific constants within one model 
specification are equal. This hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level for the main effects conditional 
logit model but cannot be rejected for the three other models. 
 
Model 2  Prob. > 2  
CL Main 6,20 0,0451 
CL Main & IA 5,72 0,0573 
RPL Main & IA 3,47 0,1766 
Correlated RPL Main & IA 2,75 0,2534 
H0: ACS1 = ACS2 = ACS3. Critical   value:  
2
0.05 2  = 5.99 
Table 7: Results of a Wald test on the equality of the alternative specific constants. 
Main effects 
Except for the announcement and season attributes, all main effects have been estimated 
significantly different from zero (99% confidence level) in all models. Moreover, all significant 
parameters have the expected sign. Both the announcement and the season attributes are 
estimated significantly in the main effects CLM. The season attribute remains significant in the CL 
Main & IA and the RPL Main & IA models, but is not significant in the correlated RPL Main & IA 
model. The announcement attribute is not significant in the CL Main & IA and the RPL Main & IA 
model and becomes significant with opposite sign in the correlated RPL Main & IA model. However, 
note that in the RPL models, the estimates of the mean of the random parameters should not be 
interpreted on their own. What really matters is the distribution of the preference parameter, which 
implies that the estimated standard deviation of the preference distribution and the estimates of the 
fixed parameters of the covariates with which they interact should also be considered. Taking this 
into account, it is more meaningful to focus on the significance of the estimates of the standard 
deviations or the elements of the Cholesky matrix (Table 9) which suggests that preferences for all 
attributes are indeed heterogeneous. 
Ceteris paribus, the CLM suggests that more power outages, longer power outages, power outages 
during peak periods and increased electricity bills will reduce household utility. Power outages in the 
summer period are preferred above outages in winter periods. 
                                                          
13 Estimation was done with Stata v10. 
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Attribute interaction effects 
In general, attribute interaction effects do not play an important role in explaining household 
preferences. One interaction effect is systematically estimated significantly different from zero: the 
interaction between duration and peak/off-peak. As expected, longer power outages generate more 
disutility in peak periods than they do in off-peak periods. 
Some interactions are systematically estimated as not significantly different from zero: number of 
power outages and season, duration and announcement, season and announcement, and season 
and peak/off-peak. The other interaction effects have varying significance depending on the model 
that is considered. 
Focusing on the RPL model with correlated random effects, we observe that the interaction between 
the frequency of power outages and duration is significantly negative, which is in line with our 
intuition. Moreover, the interaction between the number of power outages and peak/off-peak is 
also negative, which is again in line with what one would expect. An increase in the number of 
power outages is disliked more in peak periods that it is in off-peak periods. The last interaction 
effect that is estimated significantly in the correlated RPL model is the interaction between 
announcement and peak/off-peak. The negative sign suggests that the announcement of a power 
outage is disliked more in peak periods than it is in off-peak periods, which is counterintuitive. 
Interactions with socio-demographic covariates 
A global comparison of the interaction effects between the power outage attributes and other socio-
demographic covariates shows that all models generate quite similar results in terms of the 
parameter signs. Only a few variables were estimated with different signs in the three models. 
Overall, the RPL models generate more significant parameter estimates, indicating that these 
variables explain some of the preference heterogeneity around the mean of the random parameter 
with which they are interacted. 
We also checked whether more complex models have more explanatory power than simpler 
versions. Log-likelihood ratio tests for both RPL models reject the null-hypothesis that the RPL 
models do not provide additional explanatory power relative to the CLM model with interactions 
included. Moreover, a log-likelihood ratio test that compares both RPL models allows rejecting the 
hypothesis that the random parameter estimates would not be correlated, i.e. the correlated RPL 
model outperforms the three other models. 
Attitude 
The variable that reflects a respondent’s attitude regarding his or her willingness to pay for reducing 
the probability of a power outage ( WTPA ) has been interacted with the frequency, the duration and 
the bill attribute. A respondent with a clearly expressed negative attitude regarding his willingness to 
pay when the probability of power outages would be reduced, dislikes an increase in the frequency 
of power outages less than a respondent with unclear or positive attitudes regarding WTP. This is in 
line with what we would expect. Respondents that expressed a negative attitude regarding their 
willingness to pay, probably did so because they do not care too much about extra power outages. 
They will therefore incur less disutility when an extra power outage occurs. 
Also for the interaction with the Bill attribute, the estimates have the expected sign. Respondents 
with a clearly expressed positive WTP attitude have less disutility from a higher electricity bill. 
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Respondents with a clearly expressed negative WTP attitude (they do not want to pay) incur higher 
disutility from increased electricity bills. 
Attitudes seem to be much more explicit when it comes to the question whether one is willingness 
to accept more power outages ( WTAA ) in return for a decrease in the electricity bill. Respondents 
with a strong positive attitude regarding their willingness to accept more power outages get less 
disutility from an increase in the frequency of power outages than respondents with unclear 
attitudes. Moreover, respondents with a strong negative attitude regarding an increase in the 
frequency of power outages clearly dislike an increase in the frequency of power outages more than 
respondents that do not have a strong opinion on this matter. A similar observation, but less 
significant is made with regard to the duration of power outages. Respondents that are willing to 
accept more power outages in return for a lower bill have fewer problems with an increase in the 
duration of a power outage than respondents with a vague opinion. Respondents with a clear 
willingness to accept an increased frequency of power outages if that would be compensated by a 
reduction of the electricity bill show, as can be expected, a significant disutility from an increase in 
the electricity bill. 
Perception 
The perception of respondents regarding the evolution of the likelihood of future power outages 
( PrPOP ) has no explanatory power in the CL model. In both RPL models, the interaction with the 
electricity bill shows a significant effect. Respondents who think that the likelihood of power outages 
will decrease receive lower disutility from an increase in the electricity bill. Respondents that have 
opposite expectations receive more disutility from an increase in the electricity bill than respondents 
who expect an unchanged likelihood of power outages. These results might be explained by the fact 
that respondents are aware of the fact that increasing the reliability of the power system requires 
additional and costly efforts that will have to be recovered via increased electricity bills. 
Respondents that expect the grid quality to deteriorate would not appreciate bill increases. 
The respondent’s perception of the bill level does not seem to play a significant and conclusive role 
in explaining preferences for power outage profiles. Different models tend to give similar results, 
but, overall, significance is not very convincing. The RPL Main & IA model suggests that respondents 
with strong (positive or negative) feelings about their electricity bill ( ExpenP ) tend to dislike an 
increase in the frequency of power outages, a result that is not found in the two other models with 
interaction effects. Respondents that perceive their electricity bill as high to very high have less 
disutility from an increase in the average duration of a power outage or the electricity bill than 
respondents do that have no explicit opinion regarding the level of their electricity bill. 
PO Experience 
The results from the CL and the RPL Main & IA model suggest that households having experienced 
power outages over the past two year have less disutility from an increase in the frequency of power 
outages. This result could indicate that households having no experience with power outages 
overestimate the negative consequences from a power outage. Faced with a power outage, things 
might not seem as bad as expected. However, this result is not found in the correlated RPL model. 
All models suggest that having experienced a power outage has no significant impact on the relative 
preferences regarding the duration of power outages. 
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Socio-demographic variables 
Mixed evidence in terms of significance is also found regarding the age covariate. In the CL as well as 
in the uncorrelated RPL model we find that, for a given frequency of power outages, respondents 
aged 60+ incur significantly more disutility than respondents aged less than 60. This effect is not 
found in the correlated RPL model. However, in the latter model we find that 60+ respondents get 
significantly less disutility from an increase in the average duration of a power outage than younger 
cohorts, again a result that is not found in the two other models. 
A covariate that might by correlated with age is ‘At Home’. This variable indicates whether or not a 
respondent is spending most of his time at home. We can expect that for respondents older than 60, 
this will more likely be the case than for younger cohorts. We expect that, for a given frequency of 
power outages or for a given average duration of power outages, respondents spending more time 
at home will have more disutility from a power outage. However, our estimation results do not 
support this conjecture. 
As expected, households that use electric heating for their houses strongly dislike more and longer 
power outages. This effect is found in all models. In the RPL Main & IA model, households living in 
urban areas (as perceived by the households) dislike an increase in the frequency of power outages 
more than households living in rural areas, a result which is not found in the CL nor in the correlated 
RPL model. 
Finally, we find that households known to have an income in the lowest quartile tend to dislike an 
increased electricity bill more than households known to have an income in the second or third 
quartile. Households in the highest income quartile dislike paying a higher electricity bill less than 
those in the second or third quartile. 
 
 19 
 CL - Main effects CL - Main & IA RPL - Main & IA Corr. RPL - Main & IA 
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
ASC1 -1,419296*** 0,086609 -1,316103*** 0,117298 -0,628605*** 0,119857 -1,042827*** 0,116705 
ASC2 -1,422683*** 0,084281 -1,322310*** 0,110659 -0,652804*** 0,119347 -1,074515*** 0,116868 
ASC3 -1,518399*** 0,085904 -1,414441*** 0,111740 -0,740571*** 0,118857 -1,143159*** 0,116114 
   
      Num -0,269694*** 0,022368 -0,469783*** 0,101579 -2,841582*** 0,303992 -1,372221*** 0,200373 
 St. Dev.       2,559336*** 0,164455     
Len -0,006207*** 0,000388 -0,012583*** 0,002914 -0,018071*** 0,003070 -0,022796*** 0,003403 
 St. Dev.       0,007634*** 0,000665     
Pop (Peak=1) -0,154258*** 0,022827 -0,115932** 0,046169 -0,178304*** 0,063510 -0,408935*** 0,076412 
 St. Dev.       0,413317*** 0,044500     
Sea (Summer=1) 0,212124*** 0,024574 0,187863*** 0,048786 0,126111* 0,066132 -0,052745 0,076181 
 St. Dev.       -0,533442*** 0,043185     
Ann (Ann=1) 0,118537*** 0,022926 0,067868 0,052149 0,053013 0,064149 -0,137118* 0,073546 
 St. Dev.       0,439379*** 0,045168     
Bll -0,015293*** 0,001210 -0,021499*** 0,004059 -0,026868*** 0,003193 -0,028001*** 0,003359 
   
      NumPop   -0,000501 0,018869 -0,011984 0,025077 -0,044793* 0,025895 
NumSea   -0,003830 0,020278 0,024097 0,025252 -0,030522 0,025009 
NumAnn   0,027444 0,019390 0,041186* 0,024577 -0,009883 0,024739 
NumLen   0,000199 0,000274 -0,000181 0,000312 -0,000649** 0,000321 
LenPop   -0,000869*** 0,000313 -0,001295*** 0,000364 -0,001627*** 0,000377 
LenSea   0,000703** 0,000319 0,000798** 0,000366 0,000542 0,000387 
LenAnn   0,000014 0,000270 0,000019 0,000354 -0,000207 0,000366 
AnnSea   0,005863 0,019702 0,016145 0,028911 -0,030903 0,029154 
AnnPop   0,005777 0,023976 -0,004051 0,028076 -0,056279*** 0,028269 
PopSea   0,014235 0,021921 -0,007949 0,028874 -0,033419 0,029012 
   
      AWTP_L1_Num   0,155178** 0,067959 0,040615 0,132427 0,054951 0,121048 
AWTP_L2_Num   -0,000830 0,044298 0,042377 0,095865 0,179286** 0,090953 
AWTP_L1_Len   -0,000552 0,001021 -0,001715 0,001365 -0,002866* 0,001692 
AWTP_L2_Len   -0,000036 0,000679 -0,000030 0,000910 0,002028 0,001274 
AWTP_L1_Bll   0,003979 0,002470 0,004574*** 0,001670 0,004982*** 0,001706 
AWTP_L2_Bll   -0,000608 0,001773 -0,003086*** 0,001160 -0,003260*** 0,001211 
   
      AWTA_L1_Num   0,132967*** 0,042832 1,043679*** 0,140701 0,226552*** 0,079009 
AWTA_L2_Num   -0,082761** 0,037530 -0,585541*** 0,096204 -0,149094** 0,070428 
AWTA_L1_Len   0,001241* 0,000650 0,002110** 0,000945 0,002162** 0,000994 
AWTA_L2_Len   0,000043 0,000546 -0,000932 0,000778 -0,000464 0,000926 
AWTA_L1_Bll   -0,006611*** 0,002206 -0,005581*** 0,001299 -0,006519*** 0,001345 
AWTA_L2_Bll   0,002204 0,001756 -0,000536 0,001013 0,000209 0,001058 
   
      PPrPO_L1_Num   -0,071574 0,064951 -0,378081*** 0,138458 -0,065729 0,115956 
PPrPO_L3_Num   0,014309 0,055738 0,324712** 0,135552 0,023272 0,087224 
PPrPO_L1_Len   -0,000897 0,001047 -0,000432 0,001223 -0,001172 0,001408 
PPrPO_L3_Len   0,000966 0,000845 0,000306 0,001023 0,001262 0,001164 
PPrPO_L1_Bll   0,002345 0,002887 0,006395*** 0,001541 0,005644*** 0,001559 
PPrPO_L3_Bll   -0,003312 0,002564 -0,004591*** 0,001385 -0,003774*** 0,001416 
   
      PExpEn_L1_Num   -0,119335 0,085983 -0,474790** 0,228002 -0,078680 0,157635 
PExpEn_L2_Num   -0,119918 0,087154 -0,554279** 0,227802 -0,103014 0,157789 
PExpEn_L1_Len   0,003585 0,002672 0,004392 0,002850 0,004964 0,003035 
PExpEn_L2_Len   0,004433* 0,002677 0,005836** 0,002849 0,005782* 0,003033 
PExpEn_L1_Bll   0,004298 0,003333 0,002364 0,002891 0,002574 0,003047 
PExpEn_L2_Bll   0,005591* 0,003335 0,004559 0,002898 0,005271* 0,003046 
   
      ExperPO_Num   0,172124*** 0,043671 0,881406*** 0,088353 0,039156 0,065798 
ExperPO_Len   0,000389 0,000635 -0,000589 0,000735 -0,000638 0,000937 
   
      DAge_Num   -0,130746*** 0,046602 -0,657868*** 0,104584 -0,034492 0,081315 
DAge_Len   0,000359 0,000649 0,000640 0,000779 0,002406** 0,001029 
DElecHeat_Num   -0,136463*** 0,045111 -0,294690*** 0,075717 -0,146351* 0,076959 
DElecHeat_Len   -0,001267* 0,000733 -0,002329*** 0,000740 -0,001745* 0,000908 
DUrban_Num   0,007072 0,026740 -0,167396*** 0,060594 -0,011949 0,055837 
DUrban_Len   -0,000725* 0,000393 -0,000249 0,000537 -0,000903 0,000666 
DAtHome_Num   0,001680 0,038642 -0,317318*** 0,101996 0,018082 0,060223 
DAtHome_Len   -0,000534 0,000562 -0,000058 0,000708 -0,001043 0,000823 
   
      MIncLo_Bll   -0,001578 0,002943 -0,007300*** 0,001676 -0,007884*** 0,001740 
MIncMi_Bll   -0,000076 0,002062 -0,001977 0,001275 -0,001863 0,001318 
MIncHi_Bll   -0,000718 0,002129 0,003894*** 0,001379 0,004593*** 0,001429 
Df 9 56 61 71 
N 32408 32408 32408 32408 
Wald chi2 1130,19*** 1.291,39   
LR chi2   2642,05 3.025,526 
Pseudo LL -6847,92 -6572,04 -5251,02 -5.059,279 
AIC 13713,85 13256,08 10624,03 10260,56 
BIC 13789,32 13725,71 11135,59 10855,98 
*, **, *** significantly different from zero at 90%, 95% and 99% conf. level respectively. 
Table 8: Estimation results.
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 Num Len Pop Sea Ann 
Num -0,621512***     
 0,071583     
Len -0,004439*** 0,005559***    
 0,000826 0,000899    
Pop 0,866326*** 0,007140*** 0,627036***   
 0,089446 0,001336 0,060118   
Sea 0,296505*** 0,001386 0,509056*** 0,519938***  
 0,079529 0,000929 0,067407 0,059378  
Ann 0,083398 -0,002420** 0,553716*** 0,115884* 0,234631*** 
 0,063374 0,000940 0,060799 0,062248 0,061421 
*, **, *** significantly different from zero at 90%, 95% and 99% conf. level respectively. Standard errors of the 
estimates are I italics. 
Table 9: Choleski matrix for the Correlated RPL - Main & IA model. 
4. The willingness to pay for uninterrupted power supply 
The results presented in section 3.2 can be used to estimate household specific willingness to pay 
values. Although any model presented in the previous section could be used to calculate these 
values, we focus on WTP values based on the correlated RPL model as this model dominates the 
three other models presented in section 3.2. We start with a brief description of how these WTP 
values can be derived before actually making and discussing the calculations. 
Under the assumption of a standard conditional logit model with observed utility linear in income, 
the consumer surplus associated with a set of alternatives takes a closed form that is easy to 
calculate (see also Train (2003)). The consumer surplus derived from the chosen alternative i  is 
simply the utility derived from that alternative, expressed in money terms. Knowing that a decision 
maker chooses the alternative that maximizes his or her utility, the consumer surplus is  
  
1
maxn n j
j C
p
CS U
 
  (10) 
with p  representing the preference parameters related to the monetary attributes. Dividing by p  
translates utility in monetary terms. However, the researcher does not observe the utility njU  linked 
to the utility maximizing alternative. He only observes njV  and he knows the distribution of the error 
term. Therefore, only expected consumer surplus can be calculated, i.e. 
     1 maxn nj nj
j C
p
E CS E V 
 
   (11) 
McFadden (1973) and McFadden (1995) showed that, if nj  is i.i.d. extreme value and utility is linear 
in income (i.e. p , the marginal utility of income, is constant), then this expression reduces to
14 
  
1
ln expn nj
j Cp
E CS V K
 
 
    
 
 , (12) 
with K  a number known as Euler’s constant. An alternative interpretation of equation (12) is that 
 nE CS  is the average consumer surplus in the subpopulation of people who have the same 
                                                          
14 A more complex formulation of the change in consumer surplus is needed when the marginal utility of income is not constant. 
However, when marginal utility of income is constant over a range of income levels that correspond to the policy, then equation (12) 
can also be used (Train (2003), p. 61). 
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representative utilities as consumer n . The total consumer surplus can then be calculated as the 
weighted sum of  nE CS  over a sample of decision makers, with the weights reflecting the numbers 
of people in the population who face the same representative utilities as the sampled person (Yu 
(2003), p. 60). 
The change in consumer surplus that results from a change in the alternatives and/or the choice set 
is then equal to 
  
1
ln exp ln exp
After Before
After Before
n nj nj
j C j Cp
E CS V V
  
     
               
     
   (13) 
When the purpose is to compare two alternatives or profiles, for example the base case (the status 
quo) and an altered case, and if both deterministic utility terms between accolades are linear in the 
attributes, then equation (13) reduces to 
    
1 After Before
n n n
p
E CS V V

    (14) 
If the purpose is to evaluate the change in one attribute and if deterministic utility is linear in the 
attributes, then equation (14) further reduces to the ratio of the marginal utility of the attribute and 
the marginal utility of income, also known as the marginal willingness to pay15. The most general 
expressions for the WTP estimates based on our model specification are: 
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with , , , , q q q q qA P E D M  and q  defined as before. Using the equations (15) and (16), the marginal 
willingness to pay measures are fairly straightforward to derive from the parameter estimates 
presented in Table 8. In the equations (15) and (16), the numerator represents the marginal utility of 
the attribute q , the denominator can be interpreted as (minus) the marginal utility of income. 
For models in which only main effects are estimated, the marginal willingness to pay for a change in 
a single quantitative attribute q  is defined as 
  0
0
,
q
q B
WTP q N L


    (17) 
while for effects coded qualitative attributes, the WTP-value would be 
                                                          
15 Champ, Boyle et al. (2003), p. 195-196. 
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Marginal willingness to pay 
Table 11 then summarizes these marginal willingness to pay values based on the correlated RPL 
model for a consumer with characteristics as described in Table 10. The first line of the table 
contains valuation measures derived from the CL Main effects model. Comparing these measures 
with the measures for the reference household as derived from the correlated RPL model illustrates 
the impact and the importance of including additional covariates that explain heterogeneity in 
household preferences as well as the impact of allowing for correlated random preferences. 
 
Attitudes, Perception, Experience & Socio-economic variables Reference 
Is the respondent WTP for reduced probabilities of POs? No 
Is the respondent WTA more POs in return for a lower bill No 
Does the respondent expect a change in the future probability of a PO? No change 
How does the respondent evaluate the level of his/her electricity bill? Very low to average 
Did the respondent experience at least one PO within the past two years? Yes 
Does the respondent use electric heating to heat the house? No 
Does the respondent live in a rural or an urban area? Urban 
Is the respondent older or younger than 60? Younger than 61 
Does the respondent spend most of his/her time at home? No 
What is the respondent’s income level? High income 
Attribute  
Annual number of power outages 0,5 per year 
Average duration of a power outage 20 minutes 
Peak / Off-peak -1 (off-peak) 
Season -1 (winter) 
Announced / Unannounced -1 (unannounced) 
Annual Bill (euro) €600 per year 
Table 10: Characteristics of the representative consumer. 
The variation in WTP estimates over the different models is quite large, suggesting that taking into 
account interaction effects, heterogeneous preferences and correlated random effects is important 
in the context of explaining preferences with regard to continuous power supply in Flanders. 
Focusing on the CL Main effects model, the estimates suggest that a Flemish household is willing to 
pay €20,17 to avoid having power outages in peak periods, €27,74 to have power outages in summer 
rather than in winter and €15,50 to have power outages announced rather than unannounced16. 
Moreover, a Flemish household is willing to pay €17, 64 per year to avoid a one unit increase in the 
frequency of power outages per year and €0,41 to avoid an increase in the average duration of a 
power outage with one minute. 
Increasing the complexity of the model by allowing for interactions and random preferences reveals 
the distribution of the WTP values over Flemish households. As explained before, we assume all 
random parameters to follow a normal distribution, implying that individual-specific preference 
parameters can take positive as well as negative values. As a consequence, a fraction of households 
is found to have negative willingness to pay values for increases in the frequency and the duration of 
power outages. In general, however, the estimated share of households with ‘perverse’ WTP values 
is rather small: about 16% of the Flemish households would have a negative WTP to avoid additional 
                                                          
16 Note that the reference period is one year. Thus all WTP values are annual payments. 
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power outages. Similarly, we find that about 6,2% of households would be willing to pay to have an 
increased duration of power outages. On average, it is estimated that a reference household, as 
described in Table 10, would be willing to pay €43,44 to avoid one additional power outage per year. 
The average WTP to avoid a one minute increase in the duration of a power outage is estimated to 
be €0,65 per minute. 
With regard to the peak/off-peak attribute, we find that 72,4% of households have a positive 
willingness-to pay to avoid having power outages in peak periods, implying that 27,6% would be 
willing to pay to have power outages in peak periods. Given our definition of the peak period 
(weekdays between 7am-9am and 5pm-10pm) and assuming that most households are at home at 
these moments, this would typically be households that prefer to be at home when power outages 
occur. 
The WTP to have power outages in summer rather than winter ranges from -€93 (indicating a 
preference for power outages in winter) up to +€95 with a mean WTP value which is very close to 
zero. On average, households have no clear preferences about having power outages in summer or 
winter. About half of households are willing to pay to have outages in winter, while the other half is 
willing to pay to have power outages in summer. 
A similar result is found for the announced/unannounced attribute for which the WTP estimates 
range from -€85 up to €75 euro. About 55% of households do not attach a positive value to having 
power outages announced in advance. This latter result is more difficult to accept from an intuitive 
point of view as one would expect that households prefer announced power outages over 
unannounced power outages17. 
Table 11 also summarizes sensitivity analysis results. The first observation is that the WTP values for 
the qualitative attributes change, but not the proportion of the population that has a positive WTP. 
This result is driven by the model specification as, for the qualitative attributes, preferences and 
marginal utility do not depend on other attitude, perception or demographic covariates. 
As expected, households in the second and the third income quartile (medium income) have lower 
WTP estimates for all attributes compared to households in the higher income quartile. A fortiori, 
this is true for households in the lowest income quartile. WTP estimates for the highest income 
quartile are about 50% higher compared to the WTP estimates for the lowest income quartile. 
Households with a clear positive attitude regarding their willingness to pay for a reduced probability 
of power outages have a 67% higher WTP to avoid a power outage. Presumably, these households 
are well aware of the efforts required to increase power system quality and they accept that these 
efforts have to be paid for. A similar but even more extreme impact is found on the willingness to 
pay to avoid in increase in the average duration of a power interruption. In this case, these 
households are willing to pay about 92% more than the reference household described in Table 10. 
Households claiming to be willing to accept more power outages if this implies a lower bill have a 
50% lower WTP to avoid power outages. A similar result but somewhat smaller effect is found for 
the WTP to avoid increased power outage duration. Again, both results are consistent with 
                                                          
17 A possible explanation could be that respondents, when evaluating the power outage profiles focused on other attributes such as 
frequency and duration to make their choice. This would explain why, except in the CL Main model, the announcement attribute is 
found to be insignificant with a large variation in preferences. 
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expressed attitudes. Households claiming that they are willing to accept more power outages in 
return for a lower electricity bill reveal to put less weight on the quality of the power system. One 
can therefore expect that these households will also attach lower value to avoiding an additional 
power outage. 
The perception of households regarding the future likelihood of power outages influences their 
willingness-to pay. Households expecting a decreasing likelihood of power outages on average have 
a 58% higher willingness to pay to avoid power outages. Households expecting an increase in the 
likelihood of power outages are willing to pay 5% less than the reference household to avoid an 
extra power outage18. Effects of a similar order of magnitude are found for the other attributes. 
Households that did not experience a power outage over the past two years (or do not remember 
having experienced one) have a slightly higher willingness to pay to avoid a power outage. The WTP 
value is 7.3% higher. The same households have a slightly lower willingness to pay to avoid a one 
minute increase the duration of a power outage. Again, the difference is about 7%. This suggests 
that households having had a power outage over the past two years have noticed that the effects 
are not as bad as they expected a priori, if the power interruption does not last too long. 
Finally, we calculated a valuation measure for households for which at least one of the household 
members is older than 60 and is therefore likely to spend more time at home. We expected these 
households to receive higher benefits from uninterrupted power supply and, therefore, that they 
would have a higher willingness to pay. However, the simulation results show mixed results. One the 
one hand, these households are, on average, willing to pay almost same amount (+3%) to avoid an 
extra power failure than the reference households do. On the other hand, their willingness to pay to 
avoid an extra minute of power outage is about 17% lower, suggesting that these older households 
care less about the duration of a power outage given that one occurs. 
                                                          
18 Note that, in the questionnaire, this question was asked before the questions regarding their willingness to pay for improved power 
system quality and their willingness to accept more outages in return for a lower bill. In these last questions, it was made explicit for 
the respondent that increasing (decreasing) the quality of the power system would require more (less) efforts in terms of investment 
and maintenance and thus would be more (less) costly. 
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Reference CL – Main effects 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Point estimate -20,17 27,74 15,50 -17,64 -0,41 
Reference correlated RPL 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Mean -29,03 0,98 -4,58 -43,44 -0,65 
90% Conf, Interval (-110,62 up to 51,33) (-93,43 up to 94,98) (-84,9 up to 75,31) (-116,84 up to 28,67) (-1,36 up to 0,04) 
% positive 27,6% 50,8% 46,3% 16,0% 6,2% 
Medium Income 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Mean -23,16 0,78 -3,66 -34,67 -0,52 
90% Conf, Interval (-88,12 up to 40,98) (-74,45 up to 75,8) (-67,72 up to 60,07) (-92,93 up to 22,93) (-1,08 up to 0,03) 
% positive 27,6% 50,8% 46,3% 16,0% 6,2% 
Low Income 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Mean -19,57 0,65 -3,09 -29,30 -0,44 
90% Conf, Interval (-74,44 up to 34,63) (-62,98 up to 64,01) (-57,24 up to 50,7) (-78,59 up to 19,34) (-0,91 up to 0,03) 
% positive 27,6% 50,8% 46,3% 16,0% 6,2% 
Households claiming to be WTP for a reduction of PO probability 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Mean -43,50 1,52 -6,91 -72,74 -1,25 
90% Conf, Interval (-168,3 up to 76,75) (-140,55 up to 143,28) (-128,41 up to 113,22) (-188,1 up to 35,96) (-2,43 up to -0,19) 
% positive 27,6% 50,8% 46,3% 13,6% 2,6% 
Households is WTA more power outages in return for a lower bill 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Mean -23,01 0,76 -3,64 -22,83 -0,43 
90% Conf, Interval (-87,68 up to 40,68) (-74,12 up to 75,28) (-67,39 up to 59,63) (-80,98 up to 34,6) (-1 up to 0,12) 
% positive 27,6% 50,8% 46,3% 25,6% 9,8% 
An decrease in the PO probability is expected 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Mean -41,93 1,35 -6,65 -68,64 -0,99 
90% Conf, Interval (-162,35 up to 73,63) (-135,52 up to 137,7) (-123,46 up to 108,78) (-178,74 up to 35,72) (-2,09 up to 0,01) 
% positive 27,6% 50,8% 46,3% 14,0% 5,2% 
An increase in the PO probability is expected 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Mean -27,16 0,92 -4,30 -41,48 -0,56 
90% Conf, Interval (-103,72 up to 48,04) (-87,43 up to 88,94) (-79,5 up to 70,35) (-110,43 up to 26,05) (-1,23 up to 0,09) 
% positive 27,6% 50,8% 46,3% 15,6% 7,9% 
No PO experience 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Mean -29,03 0,98 -4,58 -46,75 -0,60 
90% Conf, Interval (-110,62 up to 51,33) (-93,43 up to 94,98) (-84,9 up to 75,31) (-120,33 up to 25,55) (-1,31 up to 0,1) 
% positive 27,6% 50,8% 46,3% 14,3% 7,9% 
Older than 60 and usually at home 
 
Off-peak  Peak Winter  Summer Not Ann.  Ann. Add. outage 1 extra minute 
Mean -29,03 0,98 -4,58 -44,93 -0,54 
90% Conf, Interval (-110,62 up to 51,33) (-93,43 up to 94,98) (-84,9 up to 75,31) (-118,72 up to 27,34) (-1,25 up to 0,15) 
% positive 27,6% 50,8% 46,3% 15,3% 9,9% 
Confidence intervals are produced using the Krinsky Robb method with 1000 random draws (See Hensher and Greene (2003) and Hole (2007)). 
Table 11: Marginal willingness-to pay estimates for attribute changes (in euro). 
Simulating a change from one power outage standard to another 
In Table 11 marginal willingness to pay values are calculated, i.e. changes in one attribute are 
considered, keeping all other attributes unchanged. As explained before, the estimation results can 
also be used to estimate changes in the consumer surplus generated by shifting from one power 
outage profile to another. This would be the appropriate approach when assessing, for example, a 
shift from the current average power outage profile (the status quo as defined before) to another 
average power outage profile. As an example, Table 12 considers a situation where the regulator 
would consider changing the current average power outage standard, implying one power outage 
per two years with an average duration of 20 minutes, to a new standard implying one power 
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outage per year with an average duration of 10 minutes. Stated otherwise, the regulator would 
allow a small increase in power outage frequency in return for shorter power outage durations. 
 
 
Expected Change in 
Consumer Surplus 
90% Conf. Interval % Positive 
Reference Household -15,06 (-45,83 up to 15,92) 21,32% 
Medium Income -12,02 (-36,7 up to 12,79) 21,32% 
Low Income -10,27 (-31,45 up to 10,8) 21,32% 
WTP for red prob. PO -23,61 (-72,82 up to 23,35) 20,47% 
WTA more PO for lower bill -6,99 (-32,01 up to 17,78) 31,99% 
Expected decrease in prob. Of PO -24,15 (-71,07 up to 20,89) 18,78% 
Expected increase in prob. Of PO -15,04 (-44,82 up to 14,08) 19,76% 
No PO experience -17,27 (-48,93 up to 13,88) 17,99% 
Older than 60 and mostly at home -16,89 (-48,59 up to 14,28) 18,55% 
Based on the Krinsky Robb method with 1000 random draws.  
Table 12: Willingness-to pay to move to another profile (in euro). 
The values in Table 12 do not take into account the status quo effect as we assume that the 
households have no choice19. It is the regulator who sets the new reliability standard. The results in 
Table 12 show that such a shift would on average result in a consumer surplus decrease for all 
household types in the order of magnitude of €15 to €20. Information like this can be used by 
regulators and other stakeholders in the industry to evaluate the appropriateness of additional 
investments in the power system. 
Creating a market for continuous power supply 
The estimation results can also be used to assess the market potential of power outage profile 
contracts being offered by electricity retailers or distribution companies. Technologies exist that can 
be used to steer the availability of electricity at the household level. As stated in the introduction, 
some households would prefer an increased reliability level relative to the current power outage 
profile (as described by the status quo), while other households would be willing to accept a 
reduction in the reliability level if that would be appropriately compensated by, for example, an 
electricity bill discount. 
Table 13 and Table 14 provide an illustration. We assume that in the initial market situation one 
power outage profile is available, described by the status quo. In the new market situation, 10 
different power outage contracts are supplied as described in Table 13. In this illustration, we focus 
on the trade-off between contracts having different frequency, average duration and bill attributes, 
i.e. the timing and announcement attributes are kept unchanged relative to the status quo situation. 
 
                                                          
19 Taking into account the status quo effect would further increase the loss in expected consumer surplus by about €37 to €45. Dividing 
the value of the ASC parameter by the marginal utility of income gives (approximately) -1,07/ -0,0283  €40. 
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Contract 
Frequency of 
outages per year 
Average duration 
of one outage 
Peak/off-
peak 
Season Announcement Bill 
C1 (Status Quo) 0.50 20 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 600 
C2 1.00 20 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 570 
C3 2.00 20 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 540 
C4 0.25 20 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 630 
C5 0.25 40 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 600 
C6 0.50 10 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 630 
C7 0.50 40 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 570 
C8 0.50 60 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 540 
C9 0.25 10 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 660 
C10 1.00 40 min Off-peak Winter Not ann. 540 
Table 13: Set of power outage contracts sold in the new market. 
The upper part of Table 14 shows the market shares of the contracts for the reference household 
when assuming that the electricity bill would not change. Essentially, this means that the different 
power outage contracts are provided at zero cost for household customers. The results show that 
the status quo contract remains the most preferred contract irrespective of the model that is used to 
simulate the market shares20. It has a market share of about 34% in the CL Model and 27% in the RPL 
model. The new outage profile contracts would all obtain a quite similar market share of about 5,5% 
to 9% in the CL model. When using the RPL model to simulate, market shares show more variation, 
with the 4th and 9th contract as the most popular ones, having market shares of 12,4% and 15,0%, 
respectively. 
The reference household’s change in expected consumer welfare equals -€80,6 and -€37,6 for the CL 
and the RPL model, respectively. Note that these welfare changes have been calculated by using 
equation (19). Applying formula (13) in the current example would create a bias due to the fact that 
the number of available alternatives in the initial and the new state of the world is different. This can 
easily be seen by observing that moving from an initial state with one profile to a new state of the 
world with two profiles, each being an exact copy of the initial profile, would increase welfare with a 
factor ln(2) despite the fact that the available options in the new and old state are identical. In 
general, welfare would increase with a factor  ln A Bk k  with ,B Ak k  being the number of profiles in 
the ‘before’ and the ‘after’ state, respectively. Therefore, we correct the reported welfare measures 
in Table 14 as follows: 
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The resulting measures of welfare change can be interpreted as changes due a move from an initial 
state with Ak  identical status quo profiles to a final state with Ak  new and different profiles. 
The second part of the table summarizes the effect of charging more or less to customers, 
depending on characteristics of the contract type. For the sake of simplicity, changes in the bill level 
are determined by applying a simple ad-hoc rule21. For the reference household, we again provide 
                                                          
20 For this illustration, the status quo effect is taken into account. 
21 Each ‘unit change’ in the level of an attribute corresponding to an improved reliability level increases the bill with €30, each ‘unit 
change’ corresponding to a deterioration of reliability would decrease the bill with €30. An increase in the power outage frequency 
from 0.5 to 1 corresponds to ‘one unit’, an increase from 0.5 to 2 power outages per year corresponds to two units. Similarly, an 
increase in the average duration of one power outage from 20 to 40 minutes corresponds to one unit, an increase to 60 minutes 
corresponds to two units. 
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simulation results for both the CL and the RPL model. Furthermore, the table also provides estimates 
of market shares and welfare effects for the different household types considered before. For the 
RPL model, the market shares can be interpreted as the percentage of households of that particular 
type that would opt for a particular contract. Simulation exercises like this allow assessing the 
sensitivity of different types of households for power outage contracts being sold in the market. For 
our example, the results suggest that the 1st (status quo), 8th and 10th contract would for almost all 
household types obtain the largest market shares, although their order might differ. C1 is the status 
quo contract. Contract C8 guarantees the same frequency of outages as the status quo, but each 
would have on average a one-hour duration. Contract C10 implies 1 outage per year with duration of 
40 minutes. Apparently, the financial compensation provided in both contracts (€60 less costly 
relative to the status quo contract) is sufficient to make them attractive to a significant share of the 
households belonging to that particular household type. 
For one household type, those willing to accept more power outages in return for a lower bill, 
contract C3 enters the top three ranking. Not surprisingly, this contract implies 2 power outages per 
year with average duration of 20 minutes. 
The last column of the table shows the expected change in the consumer surplus of households 
belonging to that specific household type. The illustration shows that the expected welfare changes 
vary considerably over household types. 
The results in Table 14 can be used to construct aggregate measures of welfare change and 
aggregate market shares for the different contract types if proper weights were available. See 
chapter 2 in Train (2003) for a discussion of the method to do this. 
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  C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9 c10 ΔCS %ΔRef 
 Bill 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600 600   
Ref. household (CLM Main) Avg 34,4 7,0 5,4 8,6 7,6 8,5 7,1 6,3 9,1 6,2 -80,6 - 
 (Lo /Up ) - - - - - - - - - - -  
Ref. household Avg 26,5 5,7 5,0 12,4 8,7 10,7 6,5 4,9 15,0 4,5 -37,6 - 
 (Lo /Up ) (20,2/31,2) (2,0/10,0) (0,1/21,3) (5,9/18,1) (5,4/11,5) (7,1/13,1) (4,4/8,3) (2,3/8,1) (6/24,5) (1,1/9,4) (-46,6/-27,3)  
 Bill 600 570 540 630 600 630 570 540 660 540   
Ref. household (CLM Main) Avg 27,9 9,0 10,9 4,4 6,1 4,4 9,1 12,7 3,0 12,6 -66,97  
 (Lo /Up ) - - - - - - - - - - -  
Ref. household Avg 21,0 8,4 11,6 4,9 7,0 4,0 10,5 16,4 2,8 13,5 -26,0 - 
 (Lo /Up ) (8,3/31,1) (4,7/11,1) (0,5/40,9) (1,1/9,9) (2,2/11,6) (1,3/6,8) (5,8/13) (9,7/23,1) (0,5/6,4) (5,6/19,5) (-45,4/7)  
No experience with PO Avg 21,0 8,1 10,6 4,9 7,3 3,9 10,8 17,3 2,8 13,3 -26,2 -0,6% 
 (Lo /Up ) (8,7/30,8) (4,4/10,9) (0,5/37,9) (1,2/10) (2,5/12) (1,3/6,7) (6,3/13,1) (10,4/24,3) (0,5/6,4) (5,4/19,7) (-45,1/5,4)  
Medium Income class Avg 17,8 8,4 13,2 3,4 5,9 2,8 10,7 20,0 1,7 16,1 -14,9 42,9% 
 (Lo /Up ) (4,5/25,6) (5,2/10,5) (0,9/46,9) (0,4/5,7) (1,2/9,5) (0,5/3,9) (4,6/14,1) (12,8/32,3) (0,1/2,6) (9,7/23,9) (-25,2/20,8)  
Low Income class Avg 14,8 8,1 14,6 2,4 5,0 2,0 10,5 23,3 1,0 18,4 -7,1 72,8% 
 (Lo /Up ) (4,5/25,6) (5,2/10,5) (0,9/46,9) (0,4/5,7) (1,2/9,5) (0,5/3,9) (4,6/14,1) (12,8/32,3) (0,1/2,6) (9,7/23,9) (-25,2/20,8)  
WTP for red. prob. PO Avg 25,8 8,0 8,7 7,7 8,0 6,6 9,4 10,6 6,0 9,3 -53,3 -104,7% 
 (Lo /Up ) (13,3/33,7) (3,6/11,5) (0,3/33,6) (2,3/13,9) (3,3/11,9) (2,8/9,9) (6,3/11,5) (5,7/16,1) (1,4/12,3) (3,0/15,8) (-81,0/-15,7)  
WTA more PO for lower Bill Avg 15,5 8,6 18,1 2,8 5,0 2,4 9,8 19,3 1,3 17,3 -9,5 63,6% 
 (Lo /Up ) (4,2/27,1) (5,3/10,9) (1,2/55,1) (0,4/6,5) (1,1/9,7) (0,5/4,8) (3,8/13,5) (9,5/27,9) (0,2/3,4) (9,1/22,3) (-31,3/26,4)  
Likel. of decr. in prob. PO Avg 24,7 7,9 8,7 7,2 8,2 5,9 9,8 12,2 5,3 10,0 -48,4 86,0% 
 (Lo /Up ) (12,4/32,8) (3,7/11,1) (0,3/33,6) (2,1/13,2) (3,3/12,4) (2,4/9,1) (6,6/12) (6,7/18,3) (1,2/11,1) (3,3/16,6) (-75,2/-11,3)  
Likel. of incr. in prob. PO Avg 19,8 8,2 11,7 4,4 6,8 3,5 10,7 18,2 2,4 14,3 -22,1 15,2% 
 (Lo /Up ) (7,6/30,2) (4,7/10,9) (0,5/40,8) (0,9/9,2) (2,1/11,6) (1,1/6,2) (5,8/13,3) (10,8/25,6) (0,4/5,6) (6,1/20,5) (-41,9/9,7)  
60+ & usually at home Avg 20,4 8,1 10,9 4,8 7,2 3,8 10,8 17,8 2,7 13,6 -25,1 3,7% 
 (Lo /Up ) (8,3/30,3) (4,5/10,7) (0,5/38,8) (1,1/9,7) (2,4/12,0) (1,3/6,5) (6,1/13,2) (10,7/24,9) (0,5/6,1) (5,6/19,9) (-44,4/7,2)  
Table 14: Market shares of power outage contracts and impact on consumer surplus (ΔCS) for varying household types. 
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5. Summary and conclusions 
This paper tackles the question whether and to what extent Flemish households are willing to pay 
for uninterrupted power supply or, stated differently, how much they are willing to accept for 
decreased reliability levels. The data were collected via choice experiments which were then used to 
estimate a set of logit models ranging from a main effects conditional logit model to random 
parameter logit model with interaction effects and correlated preferences. Power outages are 
characterized by 6 attributes: annual frequency, duration, peak or off peak, announced or 
unannounced, winter or summer and invoice impact.  
The estimation results are in line with prior expectations and show that households do value the 
different characteristics of a power outage. Moreover, the results support the hypotheses that 
preferences for all power attributes are heterogeneous and that the mean parameters for frequency 
and duration depend on attitude, perception, experience and socio-demographic characteristics. The 
model estimates also reveal the presence of a significant status quo effect, since households prefer 
not to change to another power outage profile. 
The estimates are then used to assess the marginal willingness to pay by Flemish households for 
each of the power outage attributes. The results suggest that the mean willingness to accept for a 
one unit increase in the average frequency of power outages is in the order of magnitude of €30 to 
€50 per year for most household types, while the marginal willingness-to-accept for a one minute 
increase in the average duration of power outages lies in the range €0,40 to €0,60 per minute per 
year. Overall, the estimates suggest that Flemish households have heterogeneous preferences 
regarding power outage attributes and that a significant share of them is willing to switch to a lower 
reliability level if that would be compensated by a relatively small electricity bill discount. 
The distribution of preferences for the season and announcement attributes is less clear. About half 
of the sample prefers power outages to occur in summer rather than in winter. Again, about half of 
the sample prefers power outages not to be announced, a result that is counterintuitive. With 
regard to the timing of power outages within the day, about 75% of households prefer power 
outages to occur in off-peak periods. On average, households are willing to pay about €30 per year 
to have power outages in off-peak rather than in peak periods.  
The paper also illustrates expected changes in consumer surplus when moving to another power 
outage profile (for example imposed by a regulator) or when moving to a market in which power 
outage profile contracts are being sold. These illustrations show that, despite the status quo effect, a 
significant percentage of households would actually be willing to switch to another power outage 
profile in return for compensation that remains within an acceptable range of about 5% to 10% of 
the electricity bill. 
From a policy perspective, the results are interesting as they suggest that a not too small proportion 
of Flemish households would be willing to switch to another power outage profile in return for an 
affordable compensation. The social benefit would be found in the grid and power station 
investment outlays that can be avoided by using lower reliability standards. Moreover, the same 
type of information can also be used by retailers and other private firms that sell electricity services 
such as power with different reliability characteristics. 
One of the major shortcomings of this paper is the assumption of normally distributed preferences 
for frequency and duration, yielding unreasonable (i.e. negative) WTP-estimates for a non-negligible 
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fraction of the population. Future research based on this data should focus on estimating models 
with more appropriate assumptions regarding the distribution of these preferences. 
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Appendix A 
In the table below you can find some power outage scenarios. Each scenario can be interpreted as a 
minimum quality objective that your electricity company should achieve in the next year. Each scenario also 
implies an effect on your annual electricity bill. Indicate, for each of the 12 choice sets, what scenario you 
would prefer. You can also choose to keep the current situation. 
Draw a circle around the preferred scenario. 
Block Scenario 
Frequency 
of PO per 
year 
Duration of 
the PO 
Season Timing Announced Change in Bill 
4.1 A 4 15 min. Winter Peak Yes 10% reduction 
4.1 B 4 15 min. Summer Off-peak No No effect 
4.1 C 1 15 min. Summer Peak No No effect 
4.1 D You prefer the current situation 
… 
Block Scenario 
Frequency 
of PO per 
year 
Duration of 
the PO 
Season Timing Announced Change in Bill 
4.12 A 4 30 min. Summer Peak Yes 10% reduction 
4.12 B 4 30 min. Winter Peak Yes No effect 
4.12 C 4 4 hrs Summer Off-peak Yes 10% reduction 
4.12 D You prefer the current situation 
Table 15: Extract taken from one block of 12 choice sets. 
